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I.

INTRODUCTION

The amendments to the Constitution of the United States, to
which we commonly refer as the Bill of Rights, were proposed by
Congress on September 25, 1789, and became part of that Constitution on December 15, 1789. It was upon that ratification that
the American revolution finally was completed; the amendments
made explicit in the Constitution the premises of that revolution.
The key terms in the previous two sentences are "Constitution,"
"revolution," and "Bill of Rights." Because we are celebrating
political events which occurred in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, we should try to use those terms in the same sense
that they were used at that time. The terms "Constitution,"
"revolution," and "Bill of Rights" had meanings for educated
Americans in that quarter century which are not necessarily the
same as the meanings with which we use those terms today.
Take the word "revolution." Most of us think of the American revolution as a war which commenced at Lexington, Massachusetts, on April 19, 1775, and which ended at Yorktown,
Virginia, when General Cornwallis surrendered on October 19,
1781. That was not the eighteenth centiry usage of the word
"revolution" among educated people. At that time, it primarily
meant a change in the established order of things. True, most
such changes in the established order of things were accompanied by-probably even caused by-a war. The term "revolution," however, referred not to the military outcome, which
might simply have put the victor in charge of the same old structure of relationships in society, but to the new structure in those
relationships.'
Take the term "Constitution." Most of us, when we hear
that term, think of the American written Constitution enforced by
the courts as law. In 1787 the term had been in use, however, for
several hundred years to refer to something entirely different,
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namely, the appropriate boundaries, often vague, between the
sovereign and his subjects. 2 In 1787, when the American written
national Constitution was drafted, Englishmen had been struggling with the appropriateness of their constitution for several
centuries, during which England underwent several revolutions.
Americans, who had lived on this side of the Atlantic Ocean for a
century and a half, had largely been spectators of those revolutionary events, rather than participants in them. Their happy situation as spectators, however, did not mean that they were
ignorant of the issues of sovereignty which were being fought out
in the British Isles.
Take, finally, the phrase "Bill of Rights." The eighteenth
century use of this term was both specific and generic; it was specific in the sense that it originated as a reference to a specific
English statute passed in 1689. It was generic in the sense that it
referred, by 1789, to a theory of sovereignty which the 1689 statute was thought to reflect. When, during the ratifying debates
on the 1787 constitution, the Anti-federalists rallied under the
banner of a bill of rights and forced the Federalists to propose
one, they were less interested in the specific than the generic usage. It is that usage I propose to explore.
II.

SEVENTEENTH CENTURY SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY

In 1758, David Hume observed that all governments,
whether despotic and military or free and popular, depend upon
the good opinion of the governed.4 Hume made this profound
observation at a time when government on the western side of
the Atlantic had been, relatively speaking, both free and popular
for seven generations. During those same seven generations, the
British Isles, in contrast, underwent periods of despotism and of
civil war which tested the limits of public acceptance of the legitimacy of traditional theories of sovereignty. Appreciation of the
uses in North America of late eighteenth century political vocabulary demands putting one's self in the position of those happy
spectators who watched from afar the turmoil in the mother
country.
2 See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 175-

84 (1967).
3 See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 266
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Modern government came to England with the Norman
Conquest. 5 The title "William the Conqueror" tells us the real
source of Norman authority to impose such government. Norman political power came from the possession of superior force. 6
As Hume later observed, however, an elite minority could not in
the long run maintain its ascendancy in the face of opposition
from those governed. Thus, opposition to the Norman kings and
their successors continued, culminating in the faceoff at Runnymeade onJune 15, 1215, when KingJohn, the Roman Catholic
Bishops, and the Barons worked out a complicated set of legal
fictions which served to legitimize royal sovereignty.
One legal fiction was that the monarch's right to govern had
been confirmed by the Pope, as Christ's vicar on earth. Royal
power to govern was legitimized by association with a source of
power which, in the popular imagination, was more significant
than force of arms. This fiction assumed that all rights were derived from the same spiritual source. The Magna Charta, after
first acknowledging the special position of the Roman Catholic
Church, continued with the statement that "[w]e also have granted
to all the freemen of our kingdom, for us and our heirs for ever,
all the underwritten liberties, to be had and holden by them and
their heirs, of us and our heirs for ever." 7 The use of the language "we also have granted" confirms the fiction. Although
King John used this rhetorical form, the reality was that the Bishops and Barons at Runnymeade commanded sufficient physical
power to confront that of their Norman sovereign and assented
toJohn's continuance in office on terms which they dictated. The
Bishops and Barons, themselves a small minority in England,
willingly embraced the fiction because their own special positions
were also thereby legitimated. The Magna Charta says as much,
putting in King John's mouth the following words: "All the
aforesaid customs and liberties, which we have granted to be
holden in our kingdom, as much as it belongs to us, towards our
people of our kingdom, as well clergy as laity shall observe, as far
5 A comparatively sophisticated central government existed under the AngloSaxon kings which the Normans expanded and refined. See V. GALBRAITH, THE
MAKING OF DOMESDAY BOOK (1961); DOMESDAY BOOK: A REASSESSMENT (P. Sawyer
ed. 1985).
6 William did in fact have a legitimate claim to the English throne. See D. DOUGLAS, WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR; THE NORMAN IMPACT UPON ENGLAND 169 (1964).
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as they are concerned, towards their tenants." ' The Magna
Charta is a remarkably detailed code of laws on various subjects,
all wrapped up in the fiction that the source of those laws is the
king's exercise of authority of divine origin, confirmed by the
church of Rome.9 The fiction was not that God had created man
with rights with which the sovereign could not interfere, but that
God's vicar on earth recognized the sovereign's authority to
grant or withhold rights. In theory, the king was the source of all
law and even the Bishops and Barons, having empirically disproved the theory, continued to acknowledge the fiction.
By the late sixteenth century, when Englishmen began colonizing in the Western Hemisphere, disputes between the king
and the church had seriously eroded the effectiveness of the Roman connection as a useful fiction for the legitimation of authority. The charters granted to various explorers and entrepreneurs
by Henry VII, Elizabeth I, James I, and Charles I, authorizing
colonization in their names, all commenced with the familiar announcement that each was sovereign by the Grace of God. Like
the Magna Charta, colonization charters were couched in the
form of grants of rights from a monarch exercising such dispensing spiritual authority.' 0 Thus, the very titles of the leaders of
colonial America to their positions of authority, like the titles of
the Bishops and Barons at the time of the Magna Charta, depended on the same fiction. In England, however, by the early
seventeenth century the fiction had been refined to accommodate
the new reality that the forces aligned with Rome and the forces
aligned with the English king opposed each other. For the Stuart
kings, in particular, the refinement eliminated the Roman connection in favor of an assertion that their authority to rule was
derived directly from God. It was from monarchs asserting this
fiction that English colonial charters were received."' Thomas
Hobbes was perhaps the leading expositor of a theoretical justifi8 Id. at cap. 60.
9 See id.
10 See, e.g., 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3783-89 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND

(First Charter of Virginia in 1606); 3 FEDERAL AND STATE
1846-60 (Charter of Massachusetts Bay in 1629); id. at 1677-86
(Charter of Maryland granted to Lord Baltimore in 1632).
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cation for the new fiction in which the king, freed from the supposed constraints of the Roman church, became head of both
church and state. Asserting that the Church of Rome was nothing more than the old Holy Roman Empire in disguise, hejustified subjugation of the church to the nation-state, a state in which
the fictional sources of all rights, in matters even of religion, were
12
derived from a king who spoke directly for God.
When the American colonists received their charters, the
English Parliament had not yet emerged as a locus of sovereignty. In theory, it was no more than a collection of wise counselors, called at the king's pleasure to consult with him and
propose laws which only he could promulgate, and to agree on
behalf of the places they represented to grant him revenue. During the reign of James I, however, when colonization in North
America was in its infant stages, the reality and the theory of the
role of Parliament began to separate. While the king still proclaimed himself as the source of all rights and the authority for all
law, he became increasingly dependent upon the members of
Parliament in maintaining the good opinion of the country upon
which his actual ability to govern depended.
Two new fictions were developed in the early seventeenth
century to achieve that end. The first fiction was that members of
Parliament were representatives of the people rather than counselors to the king. 3 The second fiction was that the king, as
God's lieutenant, could do no wrong, although his ministers, bailiffs, or judges might occasionally misperceive the king's will. 4
In their representative capacity, the members of Commons could
claim to speak for all subjects, although Commons was far from
truly representative. But the representation fiction and the fiction that the king could do no wrong permitted the assertion, in
the Petition of Right of 1628, that the king's subjects could not
be taxed or confined by his ministers without "common consent
12 See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: PARTS I AND II 79-80, 241, 326-27 (1960).
13 E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE, supra note 11, at 38-54.
14 Id. at 53. A famous exchange between Charles II and Lord Rochester

captured the distinction in a more lighthearted fashion. As a royal epitaph, Rochester
once suggested:
Here lies our sovereign lord the King
Whose promise none relies on;
He never said a foolish thing,
Nor ever did a wise one.
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 407 (2d ed. 1955). To which Charles replied:
"This is very true; for my words are my own, and my actions are my ministers." Id.
at 136.
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by act of [P]arliament" and without "the process of law."' 5 The
fictions were carried a step further about that time when Commons began the practice of presenting to the House of Lords
bills of impeachment of the king's ministers. Still, however, the
source of all rights was God's lieutenant. Parliament merely began to assert that in some instances it knew the king's will better
than he did.
The king's response to the assertion of rights, which his ministers must recognize even though he did not, was to refuse to
convene a Parliament from 1630 to 1640. In the latter years, the
necessity for restoring the good opinion of the country required
that one be convened, and soon after it convened the parliamentarians forced the king to accept a Triennial Act which provided
that Parliament would sit every three years whether he called
them or not. By the device of impeachment, the self-proclaimed
representatives of the people could, at least triennially, punish
his ministers for misunderstanding his will. Thus, the first step
was taken toward transferring accountability of governmental
ministers from king to Parliament. Lord Coke summarized the
new fictions in the oft-quoted aphorism "non sub homine sed
sub Deo et lege." Coke has sometimes been associated with the
assertions of a natural law jurisprudence but, if so, his jurisprudence still depended on the fiction of the divine authority for the
exercise of sovereignty.' 6
The religious civil wars in England in the mid-seventeenth
century placed enormous pressure on the fiction of divine origin
of the sovereign's authority as the source of legitimation of the
regime. They also exposed the fiction of representation, because
when a Protestant Parliament came into being it simply stayed on
from 1640 to 1653, carrying on a civil war against the nominal
source of its authority to govern. Gradually purging 110 dissidents from its ranks, and thus, depriving of representation the
geographic areas which had designated those dissidents, the
Long Parliament first raised an army and eventually in 1649 deposed and beheaded their heretical king.' 7 Interestingly, neither
in the Long Parliament nor during the Commonwealth did the
parliamentarians advance what we would today call a democratic
15 3 Car. 1, ch. 4 (1628), reprinted in
Cooper ed. 1978).
16
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justification for their actions. Issues like toleration of Roman
Catholics would not be decided by majority vote of the people,
but by their self-appointed and self-perpetuating representatives.
In justification for their actions, the roundheads relied upon still
another fiction. The newest fiction was that William the Conqueror's authority and that of his successors depended, not on
conquest (which was the truth) and not on his legitimation by the
Vicar of Christ (the older fiction), but on a contract between him
and the people's representatives. If the king breached that contract, the people's representatives had a duty to depose him. If
there was a people, it was the Parliament's so-called "New Model
Army."'" The roundheads' true source of authority, like that of
William the Conqueror, was success in arms. But like William's
successors on the throne, the roundheads needed more than this
to persuade the mass of the population to submit to their government. There were obvious flaws in the roundheads' reliance on
the sovereignty of the people, for if the people were sovereign
they could depose Parliament, and it is likely that an actual majority in the kingdom had favored the king. 9
An effort by the Levellers to promote an actual rather than
fictional social compact-a proposed agreement of the people to
be signed by every Englishman who agreed to transfer to his representatives specified but limited powers of government-was
firmly rejected by the House of Commons as seditious. The
roundheads' position was that once the fictional people conferred authority upon their fictional representatives in Parliament
that authority was irrevocable. The representatives of the people
thus could suppress heresy even if a majority in the kingdom
was heretical. Oliver Cromwell did so, passionately and
20
ferociously.
The Leveller contractareans were soon put down. In 1653
Cromwell unilaterally dissolved the remnants of the Parliament
elected in 1640 and proclaimed a new Instrument of Government, pursuant to which elections were held for a unicameral
Parliament with a strictly limited franchise. Seeking a way to legitimate itself, this body created a new House of Lords and urged
the restoration of a monarchy. The king, however, would be chosen by Parliament rather than by the hereditary hand of God.
18 So argued, among others, the influential parliamentary leader Sir Henry
Vane. See H. VANE, A HEALING QUESTION (1656).
19 See E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE. supra note 11, at 70-83.
20 1(. at 20.
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Cromwell accepted the kingly powers tendered, but declined the
title. 2
After Cromwell died in 1658, the surviving members of the
Long Parliament, who first had been called to Westminster by the
king eighteen years before and dismissed by Cromwell five years
before, reassembled there. They struggled for two years to find a
way to govern a country increasingly dissatisfied with the excesses of military dictatorship. In 1660 the Rump members restored those members of the 1640 Parliament who had been
purged, and that body dissolved itself in favor of a Convention
which it summoned into existence.
The Convention promptly restored Charles II to the throne.
It also passed bills which confirmed the Magna Charta and the
Petition of Right. 22 This reconfirmation, however, merely restored the fiction that the king alone was the locus of sovereignty
and the source of rights. When Charles II called a new Parliament in 1661, the fiction of representation was temporarily interred. Its members disclaimed any legislative authority apart
from the king, emasculated the Triennial Act, and restored the
national Church of England with the king as its head. Charles II
and his successor, James, failing to understand what Hume later
explained, acted as if the fiction of their direct relationship with
God was fact, and soon ran into trouble in dealing with their parliamentary counselors. Religious bigotry was the dominant opinion driving these English elects, and they reacted with alarm
when Charles displayed a sympathetic attitude toward Catholics.
Their alarm, however, did not immediately produce a resurrection of the fiction that Parliament represented the people. It
would have been hard to make much use of that fiction as a way
of assuring favorable opinion because the members of Parliament did not face an election from 1661 to 1679. Faced with the
prospect that his Catholic brother might succeed to the throne,
the Parliamentarians sought to change the succession, but
Charles II would not agree, and between 1679 and 1681 he dissolved four Parliaments. It was in this climate that Algernon Sidney, who was hanged for treason in 1683, and John Locke, who
escaped to Holland in 1682, began to develop a refined version
of a fiction of representation. Locke's influential Two Treatises of
Government, first published in 1698, but written earlier, was at bot21 See LEVELLER
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torn a justification for parliamentary exclusion from the throne of
Charles II's Roman Catholic brother, James.2 3 Charles' steps in
gerrymandering Parliament were so successful, however, that
when he died in 1685 James succeeded to the throne challenged
only by an abortive rebellion led by the Duke of Monmoth,
Charles' bastard son.2 4
Unfortunately for James, his daughter Mary was married to
William of Orange, who, like William the Conqueror and Oliver
Cromwell, had the real rather than fictional source of sovereignty-an army with a proven record of success. Mary was next
in line for the throne when a son was born to her father. The
opponents of a king, sympathetic to Roman Catholics, encouraged William to spread the story that the child had not been
born to the Queen, but had been smuggled into her bed. Acting
on the fiction that he had to preserve God's true hereditary succession, William demanded that a new parliament, elected on the
old apportionment plan, be called to determine the succession.2 5
This ultimatum caused James to flee to France without calling a
new parliament.
With the king out of the country, a "Convention" chosen in
the manner William of Orange demanded, convened and, acting
in the name of the people, declared that James had breached his
fictional contract with it. 2 6 After declaring the throne vacant, this
corporate embodiment of the people came up with an unusual
blend of fictions, when it offered the throne not to Mary alone,
who had a hereditary, and thus a divine claim, but to William as
well. Therefore, the Convention attempted to blend in the
throne both the fiction of the divine right of kings and the fiction
that kings were selected by a social compact with the people. It
was the government compact fiction which was most relied upon,
however, because in offering the throne to William and Mary the
Convention laid down conditions to which they had to assent.
William and Mary accepted those conditions and ascended to the
throne. Once they were in place, the Convention declared itself
23 J.
24

LOCKE,

Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 45-66 (P. Laslett 2d ed. 1967).
COUNTRY AND COURT: ENGLAND 1658-1714 (1978); J. JONES, THE
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25 See THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CONSTITUTION 1688-1815

(1961).
(E. Williams ed.

1970).
26 1 use the pronoun "it," rather than "them," because this assertion of the new
civil compact refers not to individual rights held by real persons, but to rights held
collectively by the artificial construct, an elite group, one house of which was
elected by a narrow and unequal franchise, embodying in its corporate self the ultimate source of sovereignty.
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to be a parliament, and presented their conditions as a bill for the
king's assent. 2 7 King William signed the bill on December 16,
1689 making it a statute.2 8 That statute is the Bill of Rights, to
which so many subsequent references were made in North
America in the following century. The Bill of Rights, therefore,
is the first physical manifestation of the theretofore entirely mystical, and even then entirely fictional, government compact.
The next year Locke's influential book, written earlier, was
published.2 9 His purpose seems to have been to legitimate a new
constitution-a new order of things-in which king and parliament shared sovereignty. Locke wrote provocatively of man in a
state of nature entering into a social compact, but made it quite
clear that the dissolution of the government which had occurred
with disturbing frequency during the religious wars did not restore that natural state. Society continued, the social compact
continued, and representative elites who had power could undertake to act on behalf of all, includingJews and Catholics, women,
children, and servants, who had never had a voice in the selection
of those representatives. Moreover, members of those groups
had no individual rights which the representatives of the fictional
people in their collective sense were obliged to recognize. And,
while kings formerly were restrained in theory, at first by their
theoretical subservience to Rome and later by their own perceptions of God's will, the representatives of the people were never
theoretically restrained in either manner. The fiction of the government compact was no more than a justification for the all
powerful parliamentary state. As the Levellers had earlier discovered, efforts to act as if the fiction of the social compact was fact
were suppressed as treason. Although the issue was later debated, the fiction of representation of the people in parliament
was never carried so far as to require that members of Commons
vote in conformity with the instructions of their borough or
county constituencies.3 0 For the vast number of disenfranchised
persons, including overseas colonists, the fiction of representation was refined further. Although members of Commons were
elected from specific boroughs or counties, each member became
a representative of the entire people of the Empire, and thus the
27 1 W. & M., ch. 2 (1689), 9 Statutes at Large, 67-73 (1689).
28 Id. See also Appendix A (reprinting England's Bill of Rights).
29 See supra note 23. For an examination of the parallels between

William and
Mary's 1689 Bill of Rights and John Locke's second treatise of government see
Appendix A.
30 See E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE, supra note 11, at 174-208.
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disenfranchised were virtually represented even though they had
no voice in the selection of an all-powerful parliament 3 The
protection of individual persons from the fictional corporate people depended not upon recognition of individual rights, but
upon the structure of government, a doctrine of separation of
powers developed somewhat vaguely by Locke in his Second
32
Treatise.
That the fictional social compact was what the government
rested on can be appreciated from the ambiguity of the title "Bill
of Rights," for the term "bill" in eighteenth century usage was
roughly the equivalent of "petition;" a petition could become a
statute, and thus a law, only when a sovereign granted or approved it. 3 3 Thus this most famous manifestation of the Glorious
Revolution, while embracing the fictions of the original government compact and of virtual representation, schizophrenically
embraced as well the competing fiction of a divine origin,
through God's lieutenant, of positive law. And, while the Bill of
Rights restated some of the provisions of the Magna Charta, it
did not entrench them for future generations. Indeed, by 1969
subsequent British parliaments had repealed thirty-three of the
Magna Charta's sixty-two clauses.3 4
III.

LEGITIMACY AND THE COLONIES

The fiction that the parliament of England was the present
corporate embodiment of the people who made the social compact in the dim and distant past was irrelevant to the North
American situation in the seventeenth century. As noted earlier,
English colonization began there on the authority of charters
which originated from queen or king alone. Those granted to Sir
Walter Raleigh in 1584,'3 to the Virginia Company in 1606,
1609, 1612,36 to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1629, 3 7 to
31 Id. at 242-44.
32 J. LOCKE, supra note 23, at 143-44, 146-48, 151, 153, 159.
33 See S. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 280-87 (1971).
34 A. PALLISTER, MAGNA CARTA; THE HERITAGE OF LIBERTY, at 32, 37-38, 73, 89
(1971).
35 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 53-57 (Charter to Sir
Walter Raleigh granted in 1584).
36 See 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 3783-89 (First
Charter of Virginia in 1606). See also id. at 3790-3802 (Second Charter of Virginia
in 1609); id. at 3802-10 (Third Charter of Virginia in 1612).
37 See 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 1846-60 (Charter
of Massachusetts Bay in 1629).
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Lord Baltimore in 1632,38 to the Duke of York in 1664, 3 and to
William Penn in 168140 all antedated the emergence of the fictions of social compact and virtual representation. No act of parliament authorized them and no parliament, before or after their
issuance, ever invited a colony to send representatives to it. Each
conferred governmental authority as a grant from a sovereign
purporting to be divinely endowed with authority to do so.
There were differences in form among these charters, but all
were essentially feudal. Indeed the charter to Lord Baltimore
was modeled after the charter of the Durham palatinate, a crown
feifdom.4 1
Reference is occasionally made to the Mayflower Compact of
1620 as a manifestation of the social compact. Certainly the
forty-one males who signed it at Cape Cod in November of 1620
were more or less in the state of nature. The document they subscribed, however, clearly is no acknowledgment of the sovereignty of the people, individually or collectively. Rather it is an
acknowledgment of the authority of the church in civil matters,
which in turn acted on the authority of a king who claimed to be
God's lieutenant: a reconfirmation of the representations of loyalty and orthodoxy made to King James I, two years earlier, in
hopes of obtaining from the Virginia Company or the crown a
patent for colonization.4 2 It was nine years before King Charles
accommodated the Mayflower survivors with such a patent.
Still, the fiction of the divine right of a king as God's lieutenant was not very useful as a source of legitimation of governmental authority west of the Atlantic. The king was a long way off
and had no army close by to enforce his perception of the divine
will. Proprietors like Lord Baltimore, capitalistic adventurers like
the owners of the Virginia Company, or zealous clerics like the
leaders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony thus were at least as dependent upon the good opinion of the populace as was the government in England; perhaps more so. Not surprisingly, all of
See id. at 1677-86 (Charter of Maryland granted to Lord Baltimore in 1632).
See 2 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA 793-96 (K. Kavenagh ed. 1973)
(Charter of New York From Charles II to Duke of York in 1664).
40 See 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 3035-44 (Charter
for the Province of Pennsylvania granted in 1681).
41 See C. HALL, THE LORDS BALTIMORE AND THE MARYLAND PALATINATE 32-34
(1902).
42 Mayflower Compact, repinted in,SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 15, at
60; see 1 C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 249-99 (1934);
The Leyden Agreement, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 14 (H.
Commager ed. 1946).
38

39
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the charter grantees devised representative assemblies. By the
time of the Glorious Revolution every English colony west of the
Atlantic had some form of such an assembly. These functioned
until the late 1760's with little effort made on either side of the
Atlantic to define their relationship to Parliament.
The Privy Council in England and the royally-appointed governors in America exercised a veto power over colonial legislation,4 3 but in theory this power was consistent with the older
fiction that God is the source of all governmental authority.
Moreover, the use of the veto proved ineffective. The Privy
Council itself used the power sparingly. 4" The royal governors in
contrast did make regular use of the veto which was just part of
an arsenal that included powers to prorogue and dissolve assemblies and to remove judges at pleasure. In the wake of the Glorious Revolution, not even the crown enjoyed such powers in
relation to Parliament. Yet practical factors, including the governors' high turnover rate, their limited discretion in light of binding instructions from London, and most of all, their lack of
patronage insured that these inflated, paper powers remained
just that. 45 For a century and a half prior to the 1760's each colony governed itself.
There was little occasion during that century and a half for
serious speculation west of the Atlantic about sovereignty and
rights. Unlike crowded England, white persons dissatisfied with
the government of the place in which they found themselves, because of the abundance of land, were free to relocate. Thus, for
example, dissenters from the theocratic government of the Massachusetts Bay Colony moved to Providence, Rhode Island, and
to Hartford, Connecticut, where they established theocratic governments more to their liking.4 6 To the extent that a fictional
justification for governmental authority over individuals was required, the older divine source of that authority served their purpose. There was in fact, however, very little need to resort to
fictions, because government in all the North American colonies,
except at the local level, was minimal. The North Americans, until the French and Indian War, were mostly spectators rather than
B. BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 67 (1967).
For a detailed discussion of how the Privy Council would disallow a colonial
measure see 1J. GOEBEL, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE
43
44

67-71 (1971).
supra note 43, at 59-105.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
45

B.

BAILYN,

See E.
(1958).
46

MORGAN, THE PURITAN

DILEMMA:

THE STORY OF JOHN WINTHROP

1990]

357

FICTIONS

participants in the wars of the European powers and the threat to
external security posed by the Indian Nations did not require major government revenue. There were, it is true, occasional disputes over religious toleration, 4 7 but none that produced the
kind of civil wars of the English seventeenth century. When government was almost completely unobtrusive upon individuals,
the stimulus for speculation about the sources of its authority
were largely lacking.
IV.

EMERGENCE OF IMPERIAL LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY

The development of British constitutional theory between
Revolution and the Stamp Act crisis is beyond the
Glorious
the
scope of this paper. It suffices to note that when Parliament decided in 1764 that the North Americans should bear a fair share
of the cost of their external security and the North Americans
resisted, the contractarian fiction in England had passed out of
favor, while the virtual representation fiction had become dominant. Parliament had come to claim, first for Ireland in 1720,48
and eventually for the entire Empire, an unlimited sovereignty.
The assertion of parliamentary supremacy involved two aspects: one structural or federal, the other individual. Both aspects emerged in the dispute, in 1761 in Massachusetts, over the
enforcement of general warrants or writs of assistance authorized
by acts of Parliament. 49 James Otis, Jr. made a structural argument against those statutes upon which the customs collector relied, urging that because the people of North America were not
represented in Parliament that body could not bind them by legislation. He also contended, however, that even in England a law
authorizing general warrants was void because no act of Parliament could establish such a writ in violation of so fundamental a
right as the freedom of one's house.50 Otis' federalistic argu47 The Glorious Revolution produced a wave of anti-Catholic sentiment in
Maryland in particular. Initially directed at the colony's Catholic elite, the movement soon became a rebellion that resulted in measures barring Catholics from
holding office, worshipping publicly or educating children under Catholic schoolmasters. See L. CARR & D. JORDAN, MARYLAND'S REVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT 1689-

92 (1974).

48 6 Geo., ch. 10 (1719); see Note, The Empire Strikes Back: Annesley v. Sherlock
and the Triumph of Imperial ParliamentarySupremacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 593 (1987).
49 8 Will. III, ch. 22 para. VI (1696); 3 Statutes at Large 586 (1696); 11 Will. III,

ch. 3 (1699).
50 See, e.g., M. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978); J. Adams, "Abstract" of the Argument in the Writs of Assistance Case (1761), reprinted in S. PRESSER &J.
ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS

66-71 (1980).
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ment in favor of local control over economic issues would recur
in North America until the Civil War. 5 1 In the short run, capsulized in the phrase "no taxation without representation," it became a rallying cry for the emerging movement toward
independence. In that form, it was a rejection by the Americans
of the fiction of virtual representation. Otis' individual rights
point, which asserted that even for Englishmen who were represented in Parliament there were fundamental rights which could
not be interfered with, was an argument which, if not entirely
original, was at least a new variation of the older fiction that
God's lieutenant would not act immorally.
By enacting the Sugar Act5 2 and the Stamp Act 5 3 Parliament
resoundingly rejected both Otis' federalistic argument and his individual rights argument. Parliament not only imposed taxes on
the colonies, but shifted the burden of proof to defendants in
enforcement proceedings, provided for non-jury trials, and conferred official immunity on customs officials from the traditional
common law remedies against them for exceeding their authority. Thus, issues both of structural legitimacy and of individual
rights were presented by their enactments. The Massachusetts
legislature, on Otis' motion, sent a circular letter to other North
American legislative assemblies, inviting them to consult together on the circumstances of the colonies. In the fall of 1765
nine colonies responded by sending delegates to the Stamp Act
Congress in New York.54
When Parliament learned of North America's resistance to
the Stamp Act it lacked, for the time being, the physical power of
enforcement. Yielding to expediency, however, Parliament simultaneously asserted what had become in England the reigning
virtual representation orthodoxy of total legislative supremacy,
by enacting the Declaratory Act of March 18, 1766. 5- This pronouncement rejected both Otis' federalistic and structural arguments against virtual representation of Americans in Parliament
51 Indeed, it has resurfaced quite recently. Compare Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Congress has the power to regulate a
local government's governmental functions so long as it affects interstate commerce) with National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 8833 (1976) (Congress has
not the power to regulate areas of traditional local government concern even
though it might affect interstate commerce).
52 4 Geo. III, ch. 15 (1763); 26 Statutes at Large, 33 (1764).
53 5 Geo. III, ch. 12 (1765); 26 Statutes at Large, 179 (1765).
54 See E. MORGAN & H. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISES; PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION 21-70 (1953).
55 6 Geo. III, ch. 11 (1766). See Appendix B.
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and his individual rights argument that there were zones of individual autonomy which no legislature could invade.5 6 Not only
could Parliament legislate for the colonies; it could "bind the colonies and people of America . . .in all cases whatsoever. '"" The
fiction of virtual representation applied not only to the disenfranchised residents of geographic areas represented in Parliament, but also to residents of geographic areas which had never
sent a representative to Westminster. Moreover, the social compact restored by the Glorious Revolution and embodied in the
Bill of Rights, was not entrenched for future generations. It
bound the king, perhaps, but not the "representative" branch of
government. Thus, by 1766, those in control of English parliamentary government had embraced the same totalitarianism
which Thomas Hobbes had once advanced in defense of absolute
monarchy.
Attenuation of the fiction of virtual representation, coupled
with abandonment of the fiction of an entrenched social compact,
resulted in the loss by the Parliament of the favorable opinion
upon which, in David Hume's view, its ability to govern North
America depended. The fiction that a member of the House of
Commons from some obscure rotten borough in a remote corner
of England acted as a representative for the residents of Philadelphia or Boston was simply too implausible to be useful, especially
when Parliament recognized no limitations whatsoever on its
powers over those residents. The combination of positions asserted by Parliament in the Declaratory Act made a revolution
very likely, if not inevitable.
V.

JUSTIFYING REVOLUTION

While the Sugar, Stamp and Declaratory Acts deprived parliament of the good opinion of most North Americans, their local
leaders had not, in 1766, developed either a substitute theory
56 Virtual representation served as the chief justification for the Sugar and
Stamp Acts in the preceding Anglo-American debate. See T. WHATELY, THE REGULATIONS LATELY MADE CONCERNING THE COLONIES AND THE TAXES IMPOSED UPON

THEM, CONSIDERED 100-14 (1765).
57 Ironically, the phrase "in all cases whatsoever" had originally been inserted in
the Declaratory Act of 1766 in lieu of a specific assertion of the authority to tax.
The Rockingham ministry did so in part to placate the colonies' great colonial
champion, William Pitt. Pitt, however, objected to the more vague formula as well.
In consequence, the "in all cases whatsoever" language, which had been intended
to keep Parliament's claims designedly vague, was taken as an assertion of both a
general power to legislate and a specific power to tax. E. MORGAN & H. MORGAN,
supra note 54, at 277-79.
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which would legitimate government, or a substitute governmental framework. The franchise was more widely shared in the colonies than in England, and thus, sovereignty of the people was an
attractive fiction. Yet it was plain that neither a continent nor a
single colony could be governed by actual participation, as in the
New England town meetings. Thus, some sort of principle of
representation was a necessary corollary to the fiction of sovereignty of the people. At the same time, however, the evolution in
Parliament of the fiction of a virtual representation which produced the abolition of the jury trial and the enforcement of general warrants suggested that some limitation on that corollary
was also necessary.
What emerged was the principle that certain rights were entrenched against the government, not by virtue of a fictional social compact entered into by a mythical people in the dim and
distant past, but because those rights were inherent in the human
condition. The Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental
58
Congress used the words, "by the immutable laws of nature.
That 1774 document, before listing those statutes which must be
repealed in order to restore harmony, set forth a ten paragraph
"bill of rights" which demonstrated familiarity with the 1689 version. The case for a natural rights justification for entrenching
the specifics referred to should not be overstated, for Congress
relied also upon "the principles of the English Constitution and
the several charters or compacts. ' 59 The document is an interesting mixture of inconsistent themes. Its first resolve, however,
sets forth the contention that "they are entitled to life, liberty,
and property, and they have never ceded to any sovereign power
whatever, a right to dispose of either without their consent. "60
This resolve, thus, rejected the fiction that by a social compact in
the dim and distant past the people collectively surrendered to
their virtual representatives the powers which parliament now
claimed. The fourth resolve repeated the rejection of virtual representation in Parliament and disclaimed any interest in actual
representation. The second, third and fifth resolves dealt with
the extent to which colonial emigrants brought with them the
protections of an entrenched English common law, particularly
with respect to trials in local vicinages and by local jurors. The
58

1 JOURNALS

ter JOURNALS].
59 Id.
60 Id.

OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

67 (W. Ford ed. 1904) [hereinaf-
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sixth resolve contended that the colonists were entitled to the
benefit of such English statutes as existed at the time of colonization "and which they have, by experience, respectively found to
be applicable to their several local and other circumstances. "61
What parts of the English statutory Constitution applied in North
America was, in other words, a matter of local autonomy.
The Declaration and Resolves of 1774 is a brief against the
principle of parliamentary supremacy asserted in the Declaratory
Act. As propaganda associating the Americans with the spirit of
the Glorious Revolution, it probably was an effective justification
for a similar "revolution." The charge that Parliament violated
the English Constitution was, after all, the same charge made
against James II and earlier against Charles I. The new idea,
however, was that a proper constitution rested not on a fictional
conformity with a social compact, but upon "the immutable laws
of nature."6 2
Before this new idea could be explored in any depth, events
overtook discourse. On April 19, 1775, General Gage's attempt
to remove military stores from the control of local authorities-a
sensible precaution considering the assertion in the Declaration
and Resolves of the "right" to be free from coercion by a standing army-resulted in the Battle of Lexington and Concord. As a
consequence of this action, the Continental Congress when it reconvened in Philadelphia on May 10, 1775, began by necessity to
function as a de facto national government before its members
could more fully develop a theoretical justification for its existence. Without practical experience in central government, the
delegates governed to the extent that a minimum amount of government was necessary for their revolutionary situation. Having
no leisure to grapple with the new and difficult questions of government they were facing, and divided by religious, class, and
economic differences, the delegates proceeded for a year
pragmatically. 6 3 Function preceded form. It was not until June
of 1776 that the Continental Congress addressed the latter, when
'64
it appointed a committee to prepare a "plan of confederation.
Simultaneously, however, it appointed a committee to prepare a
61 Id. at 69.
62 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
63 See R. MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
1763-1789, at 312-32 (1982).
64 The Lee-Adams resolution ofJune 7, 1776 provided:
That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be free and
independent States, that they are obsolved from all allegiance to the
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Declaration of Independence which has since become our most
revered state paper.
That great state paper is rather ambiguous on the question
of whether the Continental Congress spoke for the fictional people of a single nation, or merely as an agent for thirteen fictional
peoples joined by a treaty. 65 This paper is not concerned, however, with structural or federalistic issues. What is significant for
present purposes is the reference to the "self-evident [truth] that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the pursuit of Happiness."6 6 It is "to secure these rights,"
Jefferson continued, that "governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just power from the consent of the governed."6 7 When a government becomes "destructive of these
ends," he urges, the people must abolish it.6"
British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the
State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.
That it is expedient forthwith to take the most effectual measures
for forming foreign Alliances.
That a plan of confederation be prepared and transmitted to the
respective Colonies for their consideration and approbation.
5 JOURNALS, supra note 58, at 425.
65 See E. MORGAN, THE CHALLENGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 211-28
(1976).
66 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
67 Id.
68 Id. Regardless of other influences on Jefferson, the parallels between the
Declaration and Locke's second treatise are striking. See, e.g., G. WILLS, INVENTING
AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978). Locke wrote:
The Reason why Men enter into Society, is tie preservation of their
Property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a Legislative, is,
that there may be Laws made, and Rules set as Guards and Fences to the
Properties of all the Members of the Society, to limit the Power, and
moderate the Dominion of every Part and Member of the Society. For
since it can never be supposed to be the Will of the Society, that the
Legislative should have a Power to destroy that, which every one designs
to secure, by entering into Society, and for which the People submitted
themselves to the Legislators of their own making; whenever the Legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the Property of the People, or to reduce

them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power, they put themselves into a state
of War with the People, who are thereupon absolved from any farther
Obedience, and are left to the common Refuge, which God hath provided for all Men against Force and Violence. Whensoever therefore
the Legislative shall transgress this fundamental Rule of Society; and
either by Ambition, Fear, Folly or Corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other an Absolute Power over the Lives,
Liberties, and Estates of the People; By this breach of Trust they forfeit
the Power, the People had put into their hands, for quite contrary ends,
and it devolves to the People, who have a Right to resume their original
Liberty, and, by the Establishment of a new Legislative (such as they
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Read in the context of late eighteenth century political
thought, these few sentences are remarkably illuminating.
Rights, proclaimed Jefferson, are not dependent upon a social
compact. They are inherent to the human condition. Social
compacts are entered into only for the purpose of securing them.
There is an acknowledgment of the fictional sovereignty of the
people in the reference to the consent of the governed. But the
reference to certain rights being "inalienable," is a rejection of
the parliamentary assertion of virtual representation "in all cases
whatsoever." Thus, Jefferson elegantly expresses the natural
rights position of James Otis, of the Declaration and Resolves of
1774, and of many other Americans who were speculating about
69
the relationship between men and their government.
It is, of course, true that the Declaration of Independence
proceeds to list specific grievances, most of which can be related
either to the federalistic dispute over the status of Parliament visa-vis the colonies, or to specific provisions of the English Bill of
Rights. Thus, one cannot dispute that colonial grievances were
in part structural. 70 They were not solely structural, however, for
shall think fit) provide for their own Safety and Security, which is the
end for which they are in Society. What I have said here, concerning the
Legislative, in general, holds true also concerning the supreame Executor,
who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part in the Legislative, and the supreme Execution of the Law, Acts against both, when he
goes about to set up his own Arbitrary Will, as the Law of the Society.
Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient Laws, and
all the slips of humane frailty will be born by the People, without mutiny or
murmur. But if a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all
tending the same way, make the design visible to the People, and they
cannot but feel, what they lie under, and see, whither they are going; 'tis
not to be wonder'd, that they should then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands, which may secure to them the
ends for which Government was at first erected; and without which, ancient Names, and specious Forms, are so far from being better, that they
are much worse, than the state of Nature, or pure Anarchy; the inconveniences being all as great and as near, but the remedy farther off and
more difficult.
J. LOCKE, supra note 23, 430-33 (emphasis in original).
69 On the eve of the fighting, Adams, writing under the pseudonym "Novan-

glus'" set out his views at length in a celebrated newspaper debate with the loyalist
Daniel Leonard who wrote as Massachusettensis. For the latest edition of these
exchanges see THE AMERICAN COLONIAL CRISIS: THE DANIEL LEONARD-JOHN ADAMS LETrERS ro THE PRESS 1775-1775 (B. Mason ed. 1972).
70 For a comprehensive revisionist view that colonial grievances leading to the

Revolution rested solely on Parliament's infringement of distinctively English common law rights and precedents, see J. REID. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986).
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the Declaration of Independence is quite explicit in rejecting,
with respect to any government, the fictions of an open-ended
social compact resulting in virtual representation on all subjects
whatsoever.
VI.

THE NEW STATE CONSTITUTIONS

The Declaration of Independence justified revolutionchange-but did not seriously address the consequences for government of the principles on which it relied for that justification.
The process of developing new governments, however, had already begun before the Continental Congress formally proposed
independence. By the end of 1775, three colonies had already
sought from that body advice respecting the establishment of
new governments replacing those dependent upon the crown. 7 '
Those colonies and Virginia were advised to call representatives
of the people to form interim governments pending resolution of
the dispute with Great Britain. Rhode Island unilaterally cut its
ties with the crown on May 4, 1776, opting to retain its existing
charter as a constitution. Less than a week later, the Continental
Congress resolved to recommend to the respective charter governments and colonial conventions that where none had yet been
established, new governments should be, which would suppress
the exercise of any authority under the crown.72 It was in the
local conventions or legislative assemblies, therefore, that serious
discussions of the nature, purpose, and limits of government
took place. Structure was a major concern, and in the written
constitutions which emerged great concessions were made to the
theory and practice of separation of powers among independent
branches of any government.7 3 Many constitution makers did
not, however, rely solely for the protection of republican freedom upon this Whig idea of a self-policing, internally balanced
state. Five states in 1776, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Del71 G. WOOD, supra note
72 The resolution read:

3, at 130.

Resolved, That it be recommended to the respective assemblies and conventions of the United Colonies where no government sufficient to the

exigencies of their affairs have been hitherto established, to adopt such
government as shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the people,
best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in particu-

lar, and America in general.
supra note 58, at 357-58. See 1 DEBATES

4JOURNALS,

IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-

TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
WOOD, supra note 3, at 132.
73 G. WOOD, supra note 3, at 125-256.

(J. Elliot ed. 1947); G.
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aware, and North Carolina, included separate bills of rights
which entrenched against legislative change explicit rights
deemed to be fundamental. 7 4 New Jersey that same year included explicit guarantees in the text of its 1776 Constitution.7 5
New York, South Carolina, and Georgia did likewise in 1777.
Vermont in 1777 and Massachusetts in 1780 included in their
constitutions separate bills of rights. Only the two charter states,
Connecticut and Rhode Island, which were already republican in
76
form, did not do so.
Constitutionalism as we know it today is tied fundamentally
to the public perception of judicial review. That innovation had
only just begun to develop in this early period.7 7 Thus, the distinction we now recognize between statutory and constitutional
law was not as clear then as it later became. Nevertheless, the
constitution makers of the early years of independence plainly
intended that the entrenchment of bills of rights in their fundamental laws would be binding on future legislatures, 7 ' even if
they had not yet refined that unique American contribution to
government-judicial review. This paper.does not address the
development of early American thought on the superiority of
constitutions over legislation, the generic problem of entrenchment. What it does address is the distinction between the entrenchment of a structure of government and the entrenchment
of individual rights which that government was not free to transgress. The inclusion of such provisions in all eleven of the new
constitutions adopted in response to the May 15, 1776 instruction from the Continental Congress is weighty evidence of the
popularity of the natural rights position 79 expressed in the Decla74 Id. at 271-72. New Hampshire established its bill of rights in 1783. N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. Const., art. 1 (1955).
75 N.J. STAT. ANN. Prior Constitutions, 599 (West 1971).
76 G. WOOD, supra note 3, at 276-78.
77 Id. at 453-63. Judicial review had begun to develop in several important state
cases in the years leading up to the Federal Convention. See, e.g., Rutgers v. Wad-

ington, (New York 1784); Trevett v. Weedon (Rhode Island 1786); Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (1787).
78 See, e.g., B. GALE, BRIEF, DECENT, BUT FREE REMARKS AND OBSERVATIONS, ON
SEVERAL LAWS PASSED BY THE HONORABLE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, SINCE THE YEAR 1775 (1782); THE FEDERALIST No. 49 J. Madison); Ackerman,

The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YAtE L.J. 1013 (1984).
79 Virginia was an exception to this pattern where the first state constitution was

adopted by the legislature rather than by a convention. Thomas Jefferson responded to this deficiency by advocating the entrenchment of fundamental rights
against the caprice of subsequent legislatures, ultimately through a ratifying convention and "council of revision." Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Free-

dor'" his "Notes on the State of Virginia" and his 1783 draft for a new Virginia
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ration of Independence. In these constitutions the abstraction of
the Declaration of Independence became an accepted principle
of government.
The state bills of rights were largely, although not exclusively, derived from the Bill of Rights of 1689 which after all was
only a statute. In the late eighteenth century, however, symbolically it was a good deal more. It was the manifestation, in law, of
the fruits of what for English protestants was the critical constitutional event of British history.8 0 Many of the provisions which
were borrowed deal with matters of procedure or process rather
than what today we refer to as substantive due process rights.
That does not in any way detract from the late eighteenth century
American insistence that those rights were entrenched, that the
Declaratory Act was, therefore, unconstitutional, and that their
new constitutions must entrench certain individual rights against
future governments.

VII.

THE ERRIOR OF THE

1787

CONVENTION

The defacto national government which had invited the adoption of new state constitutions technically committed suicide
when, on November 15, 1777, it sent to the states for ratification
the Articles of Confederation in which it acknowledged that each
state was now totally sovereign. 8 ' A treaty model for the government of North America was not successful and, as we know, the
Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787 was called to
rectify the error of 1777. That convention primarily addressed
structural issues including the distribution of political power between the state and the national government, and the separation
of powers among the three branches of the latter. Whether by
design or as a result of fatigue, there was very little discussion in
the convention of a bill of rights and, except for such textual provisions as the ex post facto clause, the reference to jury trials in
Constitution all reflect his concern for the protection of individual natural rights.
G. WOOD, supra note 3, at 275-76.
80 It is probably still so regarded by Northern Ireland Protestants. See K. BOYLE
& T. HADDEN, IRELAND: A POSITIVE PROPOSAL 54-55 (1985).
81 Article II of the Articles of Confederation stated that "[elach state retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right,
which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." Articles of Confederation, art. II (1781). The suicide this clause
represented, however, was more apparent than real. Congress continued to exercise substantial central powers, including the power to make war and peace, enter
into treaties, assert admiralty jurisdiction, and compel national allegiance. R. MORRIS,

[HE FORGING OF THE UNION

1781-1787, at 55-110 (1987).
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Article III, and the habeas corpus clause, none of the specific
guarantees of individual rights were included, which by 1787
8 2

were common in state constitutions.
The Anti-federalists seized upon the absence of a bill of
rights as a reason for opposing ratification.8 3 The Federalists
urged that none was necessary because the new government was
one of limited specified powers and because separation of powers
would prevent excesses.8 4 What is significant in the ratification
debates is not the dispute over whether there was a need for a bill
of rights in the federal constitution. The significant point is
rather that Federalists and Anti-federalists alike acknowledged
the centrality in the American revolution-the change from one
status to another-of the idea that real individual persons, not a
fictional corporate "people," had rights which no government,
whether monarchical or republican, could transgress. Ratification was a close thing, achieved in part because of the expectation that the federal constitution would be amended to include
what most state constitutions already had-a bill of rights reflecting those principles.8 5
True to his word while electioneering, James Madison undertook in the first Congress the task of proposing the amendments we now call the Bill of Rights. Like their state constitution
precursors, they borrow heavily from the Bill of Rights of 1689.
Their ratification completed the American revolution, for it was
only when the national constitution explicitly included the principle that certain individual rights were entrenched even against
republican majorities that our Constitution-our order of
things-conformed to the major premise of the revolution set
forth in the Declaration of Independence.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The divine right of kings, the social compact, and virtual representation were all, I have suggested, fictions devised from time
to time by governing elites to help maintain the consent of the
governed. Is the natural rights premise of an entrenched bill of
rights simply more of the same? Is the personhood of rational
82 See id. at 267-97; C. RossITER, 1787: THE (;RAND CONVENTION 159-273 (1966).
8 3 G. WOOD, supra note 3, at 536-43; see TIE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST (H.
Storing ed. 1981).
84 THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Hamilton); see PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONsTrruTiroN 1787-1788, at 143-49, 313-14 (J. McMaster & F. Stone ed. 1942).
85 See Onuif, Reflections oittie Founding: Constitutional Historiographv in Bicentennial
Peispective, 46 WM.& MARY Q 341, 370-72 (1989).
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human animals, as Hans Kelsen argued, nothing more than a
construction of juristic thinking? 86 The legal positivists pose a
difficult question which might better be addressed to ontologists
than to lawyers. Certainly the Bill of Rights has had at various
times great utility as a symbol useful for preserving the consent
of the governed. Equally certain is that there have been periods
in our history when, despite the principle that some individual
rights are entrenched against the government, many individuals
were deprived of them. The American experience with slavery is,
of course, the most graphic illustration of this paradox.8 7 It is
also the American experience which best illustrates Hume's point
that governors depend for support on the favorable opinion of
the governed, for it was over that issue that the government was
effectively overturned. On balance, however, measured against
other societies, it seems to me that our constitutionalizing of a
philosophy of government based upon the premise that all men
are "created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights" has produced more than a substitute for the fictions we rejected in 1776. In the world's history God's
lieutenants often became tyrants. The virtual representatives of
the people in Parliament often became tyrants. Our only guarantee that our own government will not become tyrannical lies in
the constant insistence that individual rights entrenched in the
Bill of Rights are living realities, not fictions.
See H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 168-92 (M. Knight trans. 1967).
See, e.g., E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL
COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1978).
86
87
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APPENDIX A
BILL OF RIGHTS 8

DECEMBER 16, 1689
An act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and
settling the succession of the crown.
WHEREAS the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster, lawfully, fully, and freely representing all the estates of the people of this realm, did upon the
thirteenth day of February in the year of our Lord one thousand
six hundred eighty-eight, present unto their Majesties, then
called and known by the names and stile of William and Mary,
prince and princess of Orange, being present in their proper persons, a certain declaration in writing made by the said Lords and
Commons, in the words following, viz.
WHEREAS the late King James the Secohd, by the assistance
of divers evil counsellors, judges and ministers employed by him,
did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion,
and the laws and liberties of this kingdom.
1. By assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with
and suspending of laws, and the execution of laws, without consent of Parliament.
2. By committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates, for
humbly petitioning to be excused from concurring to the said assumed power.
3. By issuing and causing to be executed a commission
under the great seal for erecting a court called, The Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes.
4. By levying money for and to the use of the Crown, by pretence of prerogative, for other time, and in other manner, than
the same was granted by Parliament.
5. By raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time of peace, without consent of Phrliament, and quartering soldiers contrary to law.
6. By causing several good subjects, being protestants, to be
disarmed, at the same time when papists were both armed and
employed, contrary to law.
7. By violating the freedom of election of members to serve
in Parliament.
8. By prosecutions in the court of King's bench, for matters
88 1 W. & M. ch. 2 (1689), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 15,
at 245 (emphasis in original).
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and causes cognizable only in Parliament; and by divers other arbitrary and illegal courses.
9. And whereas of late years, partial, corrupt and unqualified
persons have been returned and served on juries in trials, and
particularly divers jurors in trials for high treason, which were
not freeholders.
10. And excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made for
the liberty of the subjects.
11. And excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and
cruel punishments inflicted.
12. And several grants and promises made of fines and forfeitures, before any conviction or judgment against the persons,
upon whom the same were to be levied.
All which are utterly and directly contrary to the known laws
and statutes, and freedom of this realm.
And whereas the said late King James the Second having abdicated the government, and the throne being thereby vacant, his
Highness the prince of Orange (whom it hath pleased Almighty
God to make the glorious instrument of delivering this kingdom
from popery and arbitrary power) did (by the advice of the Lords
Spiritual and Temporal, and divers principal persons of the Commons) cause letters to be written to the Lords Spiritual and Temporal being Protestants; and other letters to the several counties,
cities, universities, boroughs and cinque-ports, for the choosing
of such persons to represent them, as were of right to be sent to
Parliament, to meet and sit at Westminster upon the two and twentieth day ofJanuary in this year one thousand six hundred eighty
and eight, in order to such an establishment, as that their religion, laws, and liberties might not again be in danger of being
subverted: upon which letters, elections having been accordingly
made,
And thereupon the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, pursuant to their respective letters and elections, being now assembled in a full and free representative of this nation,
taking into their most serious consideration the best means for
attaining the ends aforesaid; do in the first place (as their ancestors in like case have usually done) for the vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and liberties, declare;
1. That the pretended power of suspending of laws, or the
execution of laws, by regal authority, without consent of Parliament, is illegal.
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2. That the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the
execution of laws, by regal authority, as it hath been assumed and
exercised of late, is illegal.
3. That the commission for erecting the late court of commissioners for ecclesiastical causes, and all other commissions
and courts of like nature are illegal and pernicious.
4. That levying money for or to the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of Parliament, for longer
time, or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is
illegal.
5. That it is the right of the subjects to petition the King, and
all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are
illegal.
6. That the raising or keeping a standing army within the
kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament, is against law.
7. That the subjects which are Protestants, may have arms
for their defence suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by
law.
8. That election of members of Parliament ought to be free.
9. That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings
in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any
court or place out of Parliament.
10. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
11. That jurors ought to be duly impanelled and returned,
and jurors which pass upon men in trials for high treason ought
to be freeholders.
12. That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of
particular persons before conviction, are illegal and void.
13. And that for redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening and preserving of the laws, Parliaments ought
to be held frequently.
And they do claim, demand, and insist upon all and singular
the premises, as their undoubted rights and liberties; and that no
declarations, judgments, doings or proceedings, to the prejudice
of the people in any of the said premisses, ought to any wise to be
drawn hereafter into consequence or example.
To which demand of their rights they are particularly encouraged by the declaration of his highness the prince of Orange,
as being the only means for obtaining a full redress and remedy
therein.
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Having therefore an entire confidence, That his said Highness the prince of Orange will perfect the deliverance so far advanced by him, and will still preserve them from the violation of
their rights, which they have here asserted, and form all other
attempts upon their religion, rights, and liberties.
II. The said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons,
assembled at Westminster, do resolve, That William and Mary
prince and princess of Orange be, and be declared, King and
Queen of England, France and Ireland, and the dominions thereunto belonging, to hold the crown and royal dignity of the said
kingdoms and dominions to them the said prince and princess
during their lives, and the life of the survivor of them; and that
the sole and full exercise of the regal power be only in, and executed by the said prince of Orange, in the names of the said prince
and princess, during their joint lives; and after their deceases, the
said crown and royal dignity of the said kingdoms and dominions
to be to the heirs of the body of the said princess; and for default
of such issue to the princess Anne of Denmark, and the heirs of her
body; and for default of such issue to the heirs of the body of the
said prince of Orange. And the Lords Spiritual and Temporal,
and Commons, do pray the said prince and princess to accept the
same accordingly.
III. And that the oaths hereafter mentioned to be taken by all
persons of whom the oaths of allegiance and supremacy might be
required by law, instead of them; and that the said oaths of allegiance and supremacy be abrogated.
I, A.B., do sincerely promise and swear, That I will be faithful, and bear true allegiance, to their Majesties King William and
Queen Mary: So help me God.
I, A.B., do swear, That I do from my heart abhor, detest, and
abjure as impious and heretical, that damnable doctrine and position, That princes excommunicated or deprived by the pope, or any authority of the see of Rome, may be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or any
other whatsoever. And I do declare, That no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath, or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence,
or authority
ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm: So help me God.
IV. Upon which their said Majesties did accept the crown
and royal dignity of the kingdoms of England, France, and Ireland,
and the dominions thereunto belonging, according to the resolution and desire of the said lords and commons contained in the
said declaration.
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V. And thereupon their Majesties were pleased, That the
said lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, being the two
Houses of Parliament, should continue to sit, and with their Majesties royal concurrence make effectual provision for the settlement of the religion, laws and liberties of this kingdom, so that
the same for the future might not be in danger again of being
subverted; to which the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, did agree and proceed to act accordingly.
VI. Now in pursuance of the premisses, the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in Parliament assembled, for
the ratifying, confirming and establishing the said declaration,
and the articles, clauses, matters, and things therein contained,
by the force of a law made in due form by authority of Parliament, do pray that it may be declared and enacted, That all and
singular the rights and liberties asserted and claimed in the said
declaration, are the true, ancient, and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom, and so shall be esteemed,
allowed, adjudged, deemed and taken to be, and that all and
every the particulars aforesaid shall be firmly and strictly holden
and observed, as they are expressed in the said declaration; and
all officers and ministers whatsoever shall serve their Majesties
and their successors according to the same in all times to come.
VII. And the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, seriously considering how it hath pleased Almighty God,
in his marvelous providence, and merciful goodness to this nation, to provide and preserve their said Majesties royal persons
most happily to reign over us upon the throne of their ancestors,
for which they render unto him from the bottom of their hearts
their humblest thanks and praises, do truly, firmly, assuredly, and
in the sincerity of their hearts think, and do hereby recognize,
acknowledge and declare, That KingJames the Second having abdicated the government, and their Majesties having accepted the
crown and royal dignity as aforesaid, their said Majesties did become, were, are and of right ought to be, by the laws of this
realm, our sovereign liege lord and lady, King and Queen of England, France, and Ireland and the dominions thereunto belonging,
in and to whose princely persons the royal state, crown, and dignity of the said realms with all honours, stiles, titles, regalities,
prerogatives, powers, jurisdictions and authorities to the same
belonging and appertaining, are most fully, rightfully and entirely invested and incorporated, united and annexed.
VIII. And for preventing all questions and divisions in this
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realm, by reason of any pretended titles to the crown, and for
preserving a certainty in the succession thereof, in and upon
which the unity, peace, tranquility, and safety of this nation doth,
under God, wholly consist and depend, The said Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, do beseech their Majesties that it
may be enacted, established and declared, That the crown and
regal government of the said kingdoms and dominions, with all
and singular the premisses thereunto belonging and appertaining, shall be and continue to their said Majesties, and the survivor of them, during their lives, and the life of the survivor of
them: And that the intire, perfect, and full exercise of the regal
power and government be only in, and executed by his Majesty,
in the names of both their Majesties during their joint lives; and
after their deceases the said crown and premises shall be and remain to the heirs of the body of her Majesty; and for default of
such issue to her royal highness the Princess Anne of Denmark, and
the heirs of her body; and for default of such issue to the heirs of
the body of his said Majesty: And thereunto the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, do, in the name of all the
people aforesaid, most humbly and faithfully submit themselves,
their heirs and posterities for ever; and do faithfully promise,
That they will stand to, maintain, and defend their said Majesties,
and also the limitation and succession of the crown herein specified and contained, to the utmost of their powers, with their lives
and estates, against all persons whatsoever, that shall attempt
anything to the contrary.
IX. And whereas it hath been found by experience, that it is
inconsistent with the safety and welfare of this Protestant kingdom, to be governed by a popish prince, or by any King or
Queen marrying a papist; the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal,
and Commons, do further pray that it may be enacted, That all
and every person and persons that is, are or shall be reconciled
to, or shall hold communion with, the see or church of Rome, or
shall profess the popish religion, or shall marry a papist, shall be
excluded, and be for ever incapable to inherit, possess, or enjoy
the crown and government of this realm, and Ireland, and the dominions thereunto belonging, or any part of the same, or to have,
use, or exercise any regal power, authority, or jurisdiction within
the same; and in all and every such case or cases the people of
these realms shall be, and are hereby absolved of their allegiance;
and the said crown and government shall from time to time descend to, and be enjoyed by such person or persons being prot-

1990]

FICTIONS

375

estants, as should have inherited and enjoyed the same, in case
the said person or persons so reconciled, holding communion, or
professing, or marrying as aforesaid, were naturally dead.
X. And that every King and Queen of this realm, who at any
time hereafter shall come to and succeed in the imperial crown of
this kingdom, shall on the first day of the meeting of the first
Parliament, next after his or her coming to the crown, sitting in
his or her throne in the house of peers, in the presence of the
Lords and Commons therein assembled, or at his or her coronation, before such person or persons who shall administer the coronation oath to him or her, at the time of his or her taking the
said oath (which shall first happen) make, subscribe, and audibly
repeat the declaration mentioned in the statute made in the thirtieth year of the reign of King Charles the Second intituled, An act
for the more effectual preserving the King's person andgovernment, by disabling papists from sitting in either house of parliament. But if it shall
happen, that such King or Queen, upon his or her succession to
the crown of this realm, shall be under the age of twelve years,
then every such King or Queen shall make, subscribe, and audibly repeat the said declaration at his or her coronation, or the
first day of the meeting of the first parliament as aforesaid, what
shall first happen after such king or queen shall have attained the
said age of twelve years.
XI. All which their Majesties are contented and pleased shall
be declared, enacted, and established by authority of this present
parliament, and shall stand, remain, and be the law of this realm
for ever; and the same are by their said Majesties, by and with the
advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, in Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the
same, declared, enacted, and established accordingly.
XII. And be it further declared and enacted by the authority
aforesaid, That from and after this present session of parliament,
no dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or any part
thereof, shall be allowed, but that the same shall be held void and
of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute,
and except in such cases as shall be specially provided for by one
or more bill or bills to be passed during this present session of
parliament.
XIII. Provided that no charter, or grant, or pardon, granted
before the three and twentieth day of October, in the year of our
Lord one thousand six hundred eighty-nine shall be any ways impeached or invalidated by this act, but that the same shall be and
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remain of the same force and effect in law, and no other than as if
this Act had never been made.
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B

An Act for the better securing the dependency of his Majesty's
Domains in America upon the Crown and Parliament of Great
Britain.8
WHEREAS several of the Houses of Representatives in his
Majesty's Colonies and Plantations in America, have of late,
against Law, claimed to themselves, or to the Governed Assemblies of the same, the sole and exclusive right of imposing Duties
and Taxes upon his Majesty's Subjects in the said Colonies and
Plantations; and have, in pursuance of such Claim, passed certain
Votes, Resolutions, and Orders, derogatory to the Legislative
Authority of Parliament, and inconsistent with the Dependency
of the said Colonies and Plantations upon the crown of Great Britain: May it therefore please your most excellent Majesty, that it
may be declared; and be it declared by the King's most excellent
Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in the present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, That the said
Colonies and Plantations in America have been, are, and of Right
ought to be, subordinate unto, and dependent upon, the Imperial Crown and Parliament of Great Britain; and that the King's
Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons of Great Britain, in Parliament
assembled, had, hath, and of Right ought to have, full Power and
Authority to make Laws and Statutes of sufficient Force and Validity to bind the Colonies and People of America, Subjects to the
Crown of Great Britain, in all Cases whatsoever.
II. And it be further declared and enacted by the Authority
aforesaid, That all Resolutions, Votes, Orders and Proceedings,
in any of the said Colonies or Plantations, whereby the Power
and Authority of the Parliament of Great Britain, to make Laws
and Statutes as aforesaid, is denied or drawn into question, are,
and are hereby declared to be, utterly null and void to all Intents
and Purposes whatsoever.
89 6 Geo. III, ch. 11 (1766) (emphasis in original).

